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Revisiting Seminole Rock
JEFFREY A. POJANOWSKI*
ABSTRACT
The rule that reviewing courts must defer to agencies’ interpretations of their
own regulations has come under scrutiny in recent years. Critics contend that
this doctrine, often associated with the 1997 Supreme Court decision Auer v.
Robbins, violates the separation of powers, gives agencies perverse regulatory
incentives, and undermines the judiciary’s duty to say what the law is. This
essay offers a different argument as to why Auer is literally and prosaically bad
law. Auer deference appears to be grounded on a misunderstanding of its
originating case, the 1945 decision Bowles v. Seminole Rock. A closer look at
Seminole Rock suggests an unremarkable application of the less-deferential
standard of review associated with the case Skidmore v. Swift & Co. These
conclusions shed new light on contemporary worries about Auer deference,
ground the Court’s recent limitations on the doctrine and lower the stakes for
overruling it altogether. After Auer, the Court should return to Seminole Rock.
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INTRODUCTION
Judicial deference to administrative agencies is under attack. The most
besieged beachhead of judicial abnegation is the doctrine that requires courts to
defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations. Critics contend that
this doctrine, often associated with the 1997 Supreme Court decision Auer v.
Robbins,1 violates the separation of powers, gives agencies perverse regulatory

* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I am indebted to Aditya Bamzai, Randy Barnett, Evan
Bernick, Sam Bray, Emily Bremer, Marc DeGirolami, Randy Kozel, Philip Hamburger, Aaron Nielson,
Adrian Vermeule, Chris Walker, Kevin Walsh, Adam White, and all the participants at the Georgetown
University Law Center symposium Challenging Administrative Power for thoughtful comments and
constructive questions on this paper. All errors are my own. Participant funding at the conference was
provided by the Institute for Justice. © 2018, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski.
1. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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incentives, and undermines the judiciary’s duty to say what the law is.2 This
essay offers a different argument as to why Auer is literally and prosaically bad
law, namely that it is literally, and more prosaically, bad law.
Auer deference appears to be grounded on a misunderstanding of its originating case, the 1945 decision Bowles v. Seminole Rock.3 A closer look at Seminole
Rock suggests an unremarkable application of the less-deferential standard of
review of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.4 Seminole Rock was a correct application of
Skidmore deference, given the case’s circumstances and the era’s assumptions
about statutory interpretation. More importantly, it is implausible to read Seminole Rock as supporting Chevron-like deference premised on delegated lawmaking authority.5 Rather, Seminole Rock is a classically legalist opinion, or, more
precisely, is an ordinary deployment of one form of good, old-fashioned legalism, namely intentionalist interpretation, as applied in the administrative context.6
The Supreme Court’s apparently unthinking transition from Seminole Rock to
Auer was not one of doctrinal necessity. Rather, Auer deference is an anachronistic reading of Seminole Rock through Chevron-filtered lenses.7 The standard
shorthand label of ‘Seminole Rock/Auer deference’ therefore runs together two
very different kinds of deference regimes that are worth decoupling. The doubts
about Auer doctrine in its current form, moreover, flow from this generalization
and extension of Seminole Rock beyond the interpretive framework in which it
was originally at home. These conclusions shed new light on contemporary
worries about Auer deference, ground the Court’s recent limitations on the
doctrine, and lower the stakes for overruling it altogether. After Auer, the Court
can return to Seminole Rock.
I. AUER DEFERENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Auer v. Robbins holds that an agency’s interpretations of its own regulations
are “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”8
The Supreme Court did not appear to think it was doing anything particularly
momentous in Auer. The unanimous Court found this “plainly erroneous”
standard of review sufficiently obvious that it simply quoted, without further
analysis, Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, which in turn was

2. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
3. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
4. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
5. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6. By framing Seminole Rock as an ordinary application of Skidmore, my contribution draws on and
complements, but is distinct from, Professors Knudson’s and Wildermuth’s incisive argument that
“Seminole Rock deference is best described as a doctrine that has become untethered from its roots.”
Sanne H. Knudson & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65 EMORY
L.J. 47, 52 (2015).
7. See infra Part III.
8. 519 U.S. at 461.
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quoting, without analysis, Bowles v. Seminole Rock.9 In other words, any
justification for Auer’s rule of deference rested on Seminole Rock.
But what does Seminole Rock mean? It is not obvious the Auer Court had a
very clear idea about that at the time.10 Indeed, Auer’s author, the late Justice
Antonin Scalia, later regretted his opinion and observed that the Court has “not
put forward a persuasive justification for Auer deference.” He described Seminole Rock’s deferential doctrine as resting on a brute “ipse dixit.”11
There is no shortage of justifications, however. Professor Richard Pierce
claims that “common sense” justifies the doctrine: the agency is in a superior
position to identify what the rule meant, its supposed application, and the
“interpretation of the rule that makes the most sense given the agency’s purposes in issuing the rule.”12 As discussed below, this intentionalist justification
of Seminole Rock/Auer is not far from the mark, though textualists like Justice
Scalia would reject grounding the doctrine in uncodified authorial intent.13
Furthermore, authorial intent hardly justifies the categorical rule that Auer
seems to contemplate. It is far from clear, for example, that an agency has a leg
up on a reviewing court in terms of identifying the meaning of a regulation
codified thirty years ago.14 Nor may an agency be a necessarily reliable narrator:
should we trust a presidential agency to report faithfully the historical meaning of a
regulation authored by an administration of the opposite political party?15
Transposing Seminole Rock/Auer deference into a more legal realist key,
Professors Sunstein and Vermeule offer a broader functionalist justification for
the doctrine. They argue that “interpretation necessarily includes consideration
of policy consequences, and of the institutional roles that best serve to allocate
responsibility for policy consequences.”16 As an institutional matter, they argue,
9. 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989).
10. It is possible that Scalia, a former D.C. Circuit judge, just took the doctrine for granted based on
his familiarity with a strong Seminole Rock doctrine that expanded (also without much explanation) at
the court of appeals level. See Knudson & Wildermuth, supra note 6, at 86 (“As the late 1960s gave
way to the 1970s, the final transformation of Seminole Rock was on full display in both the lower courts
and the Supreme Court. As before, courts continued to expand the doctrine without providing guiding
principles or a rationale. Notably, the continued expansion of Seminole Rock was consistent with the
judicial restraint that emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s when courts reviewed administrative
actions.”).
11. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). On Justice Scalia’s regret, see generally Aaron Nielson, Cf. Auer v. Robbins, 21
TEX. REV. & POL. 303, 305–06 (2017).
12. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.11 at 532 (5th ed. 2010).
13. See Decker, 568 U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The implied premise of [such an]
argument—that what we are looking for is the agency’s intent in adopting the rule—is false. There is
true of regulations what is true of statutes. As Justice Holmes put it: ‘[w]e do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.’”).
14. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. U. L.
REV. 1449, 1455 (2011) (noting this limit on the “originalist” rationale for Auer deference).
15. For a thoughtful exploration of intentionalist justifications of Auer, see Stephen M. DeGenearo,
Note, Why Should We Care About an Agency’s Special Insight, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909 (2013).
16. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
297, 299 (2017).
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administrative agencies are far better suited than courts to balance the policy
considerations intertwined with resolving ambiguities in regulations.17 Sunstein
and Vermeule therefore favor Auer for the same reasons they support Chevron’s
fictive presumption that ambiguity is a congressional delegation of interpretative authority to agencies.18
While the Auer decision does not invoke this rationale, it is consonant with
the courts’ expanding practice of deferring to agency interpretation of regulations in the decades before Auer. As Professors Knudson and Wildermuth’s
history of Seminole Rock’s development demonstrates, judicial concerns about
the “magnitude and complexity” of the programs at issue helped push the
doctrine beyond its original confines.19 Contemporaneous academic exhortations also encouraged courts to stay their hands when interpretive choices came
“to resemble a political process of weighing the claims of competing interest
groups.”20 By 2017, Sunstein and Vermeule’s Chevron-inflected justification of
Seminole Rock/Auer is not so much an innovation as a cogent account of the
doctrine’s standard justification.21
Tellingly, the doctrine’s critics also have attacked the doctrine on Chevron’s
own terms. Professor Manning’s seminal critique of Seminole Rock/Auer draws
critical differences between the two doctrines. Chevron, which Manning does
not challenge, implicates a delegation from Congress to administrative agencies.
An implied delegation on those terms does not offend classical conceptions of
separation of powers: Congress can always defend itself by writing more
precise text and therefore delegating less authority to administrative agencies.
Seminole Rock/Auer deference, however, implicates self-delegation: the agency
drafting an unclear regulation confers on itself the power to create more law
down the road.22 Drawing on Manning—as well as Blackstone, Locke, and
Montesquieu—Justice Scalia’s and Justice Clarence Thomas’s challenges to

17. Id. at 306–07.
18. See id. at 307 (“Just as, on Scalia’s view in 1989, Chevron is the best fictional default rule for
statutory construction, so too Auer is the best fictional default rule for interpretation of agency
regulations.”); see also Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 14, at 1456 (identifying this Chevron-like
“pragmatic” justification for deference).
19. Knudson & Wildermuth, supra note 6, at 84 (quoting Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 484
(1963)); see also id. at 83–84 (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s “hands-off” to complex cases implicating
such deference in the 1960s).
20. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1787 (1975) (quoted in Knudson & Wildermuth, supra note 6, at 84).
21. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (grounding Seminole Rock
deference in the agency’s capacity to administer a “complex and highly technical regulatory program”);
Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 14, at 1457 (“As between these two justifications for Seminole
Rock deference, the pragmatic justification is as ascendant, while the originalist rationale is in
decline.”). Notably the Thomas Jefferson University Court relies on Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 501
U.S. 680 (1991), a Chevron case, for its appeal to administrative expertise. See 512 U.S. at 512.
22. See John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 617 (1996).
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such deference spotlight this self-delegation objection to the doctrine.23
Manning’s separation-of-powers challenge to Auer/Seminole Rock also raises
a more practical worry, namely that the doctrine encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules, and then subsequently use less formal procedures to clarify
their meaning.24 This temptation is a powerful one, Manning argues, because
“rulemaking costs, both political and monetary, rise with each increase in the
precision and clarity of administrative rules.”25
This worry is also interwoven in the concerns surrounding Chevron. As
Professor Matthew Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler have noted, standards of
review could affect the agency’s calculus. After United States v. Mead, courts
are far more likely to confer Chevron deference to interpretations offered
through reasonably formal procedures.26 An unqualified version of Seminole
Rock/Auer could allow agencies to arbitrage differing standards of review by
promulgating vague regulations through notice-and-comment rulemaking and
do the real policy work through less formal interpretations of the regulations.27
Stephenson and Pogoriler argue that this concern counsels for limits on Auer,
though they do not think courts should wholly abandon it. Rather, they think
that, like Chevron, the doctrine needs a more fine-tuned test for when it
applies.28 In short, Stephenson and Pogoriler seek to build a Mead analogue for
Seminole Rock/Auer to the extent such translation is germane.29
The Supreme Court invoked something like this gamesmanship worry in
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, where it held Seminole Rock/Auer deference should not apply when the agency uses interpretation of vague regulations
to spring an unfair surprise on the regulated community.30 And, like Stephenson
and Pogoriler, the Christopher Court settled, for the time being, on a Mead-like
carve-out from deference, rather than squarely rejecting the doctrine.31

23. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620–21 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Manning, Blackstone, and Montesquieu); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Locke and Montesquieu for argument that
Auer deference violates separation of powers principles). Justice Alito’s more tentative concerns about
Auer also touch on this point. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Manning and
noting that Justices Scalia and Thomas offer “substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock doctrine may
be incorrect”).
24. Manning, supra note 22, at 655–57.
25. Id. at 655.
26. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001) (identifying “a category of interpretive choices distinguished by [that] additional reason for judicial deference”).
27. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 14, at 1464. For an argument that worry about Auer
introducing perverse incentives is unsubstantiated, see Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 16, at 308–10.
28. See id. at 1504 (enumerating their suggested limits).
29. See, e.g., id. at 1490–91 (borrowing Mead’s requirement of formality in interpretation).
30. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012) (citing Stephenson
& Pogoriler, supra note 14, at 1461–62).
31. Id. at 2168 (“[W]hatever the general merits of Auer deference, it is unwarranted here.”).
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II. SEMINOLE ROCK BEFORE CHEVRON AND AUER
As the previous discussion shows, current debate about deference to agency
interpretations of regulation involves two related features. First, it understands
Seminole Rock/Auer deference as a kind of Baby Chevron doctrine; the question
is whether and how the Chevron framework for statutory interpretation should
transfer to regulatory interpretation. Second, it understands Seminole Rock and
Auer as representing a unified doctrine, linking them together both typographically (with a “/”) and jurisprudentially on the terms of Chevron. This essay
challenges both premises by revisiting Seminole Rock, its doctrinal backdrop,
and its assumptions about legal interpretation.
Before there was Seminole Rock/Auer deference, let alone Chevron deference, there was Skidmore v. Swift & Co.32 Handed down in 1944, the unanimous
opinion addressed how much credence reviewing courts should give to administrative agencies’ legal interpretations. Skidmore tells us that “the weight of [the
agency’s] judgment . . . will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.”33
Today, in the context of reviewing agencies’ interpretations of statutes, courts
invoke Skidmore when the more deferential Chevron framework does not
apply.34 One alternative to Auer deference is applying Skidmore to agency
regulations as well. What would that look like? Seminole Rock shows us just
that.
Seminole Rock, decided in 1945, concerned the proper interpretation of a
1942 price control regulation. The opinion stated that “the ultimate criterion” in
deciding the case was “the administrative interpretation, which becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”35 The Court cited no authority for this bold proposition, whose grant of
“controlling weight” to agency interpretation appears antonymic to Skidmore’s
proviso that agency readings “lack[] power to control.”36
It is possible that, in the forty days between argument and decision in
Seminole Rock, the Supreme Court fashioned a new, remarkable, but unremarkedupon categorical category of deference. It is also possible—and, I would argue,
more plausible—that the case is an unremarkable application of ordinary science and not a silent paradigm shift. Skidmore, which the Court handed down
the previous year, was more an expression of conventional wisdom about
judicial review than a path-breaking announcement of a new standard. The

32. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
33. Id. at 140.
34. See United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. at 234–35 (2001) (holding that Skidmore deference
applies when Chevron does not).
35. 325 U.S. at 414.
36. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
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Skidmore framework was plainly in the air, in the briefs, and appears to be the
basis for what Auer’s author later described as an otherwise “ipse dixit”
assertion of deference.37
As Professor Bamzai has recently noted, Henry Hart’s brief for the government in Seminole Rock explicitly relied on Skidmore,38 but it did not invoke the
proto-Chevron decision of Gray v. Powell.39 In its argument, the government
first offered a textual defense of its interpretation of the regulation and then
placed weight on the fact that its interpretation was a contemporaneous construction of the rule.40 In faulting the appellate court for ignoring the agency’s
contemporaneous construction, the Government invoked the “presumed expertise of an administrative agency in determining the meaning of its own regulation.”41 The Government continued:
Whatever qualifications there may be upon the rule which attributes weight to
a settled administrative construction, such a construction cannot be ignored
even when it involves only the Administrator’s views as to the meaning of the
statute under which he is operating. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134,
137–140. The weight to be given to his construction of his own regulations
should obviously be much greater; for then he is explaining his own intention,
not that of Congress. This Court has gone so far as to say that the latter type
of “interpretation is binding upon the courts.”42

Here we see a reconciliation between Seminole Rock’s statement that the
administrative interpretation is controlling (or “binding” as the government
suggested) and Skidmore’s stipulation that agency legal interpretations persuade
rather than “control.” If the Skidmore framework requires some consideration of
the agency’s views in the statutory context, a fortiori that sliding scale points
toward far more respect when the agency is reporting the views of its own
regulatory handiwork.43 The measure of that sliding scale, in relevant part, is
the agency’s knowledge of its own intention in authoring the regulation.

37. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617–18 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); cf. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 101 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (“[I]t is
our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.”).
38. See Aditya Bamzai, Henry Hart’s Brief, Frank Murphy’s Draft, and the Seminole Rock Opinion,
YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 12, 2006) http://yalejreg.com/nc/henry-harts-brief-frank-murphysdraft-and-the-seminole-rock-opinion-by-aditya-bamzai/ [https://perma.cc/ZCG6-GSTB]; Bamzai has uploaded the brief at http://yalejreg.com/nc/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/09/Seminole-Rock-govt-brief.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZEF-C8B4].
39. See generally Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); see also Brief for Petitioner at i–ii, Bowles v.
Seminole Rock and Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (No. 914).
40. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 16–20.
41. Id. at 20.
42. Id. at 20 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 n.6 (1940)).
43. The Government cautioned that the Court need not go so far as to treat its interpretation as
“binding,” particularly in light of its strong textual argument. See id. at 20.
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Why would that matter? Keep in mind the methodological context of the
time. Compared to today, mainstream statutory interpretation was then far more
intentionalist in orientation.44 Skidmore and Seminole Rock preceded textualism’s rejection of the validity—or even the cogency—of looking to the original
intentions of a historical legal author.45 The cases also predate the consolidation
at the Supreme Court of the Legal Process School’s focus on a hypothetical
reasonable legal author pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.46 This is not
to say all the Justices were old-fashioned original intentionalists, to the extent
they had any governing theory at all. The Legal Realist critique of legislative
intent was well-known by then.47 Nevertheless, it is fair to say that repair to
historical intent was more prominent and respectable then than it is now.48
In fact, even the then-ascending Legal Realist critiques of intentionalism had
less force in cases like Seminole Rock. Max Radin focused on the challenges of
ascribing a single, coherent intention to a legislature. He argued that, while the
search for the intention of the single author of a religious or literary text “is
precisely what we have as our task in interpretation,” such “literary and
theological methods are irrelevant” to statutes adopted by multimember legislatures.49 Even if Congress is a “They” and not an “It,”50 Chester Bowles, the
head of the Office of Price Administration, was emphatically singular,51 which
renders appeals to his intent less vexed under the Realist’s skeptical rubric.52
With that in mind, consider how a run-of-the-mill intentionalist would approach Seminole Rock under Skidmore. If the intent of the author is central, the
agency’s account is certainly something that “has the power to persuade” under

44. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 248 (1992) (citing Takao Ozawa v. U. S., 260 U.S. 178 (1922) as
an example of the Supreme Court’s willingness in that period to focus on legislative intent).
45. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547–48 (1983)
(drawing on the work of Kenneth Arrow to challenge the cogency of legislative intent).
46. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (Eskridge and Frickey ed. 1994).
47. See generally Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930) (criticizing intentionalist
interpretation); see also Frickey, supra note 44, at 248 (“By the 1950s, the legal realists’ critique of interpretive
formalism [including intentionalism] had become deeply rooted.”); REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES 68–69 (1975) (describing “The Radin Onslaught”).
48. See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704–05 (1945) (“[T]he question of
whether the statutory right may be waived depends upon the intention of Congress as manifested in the
particular statute.”); see id. at 705 (identifying statutory language, legislative reports, and legislative
debates as sources of intent).
49. Radin, supra note 47, at 867.
50. Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. OF L. & ECON. 239 (1992). The conceptual coherence of identifying an administrative
author’s intention, of course, is not the same as stating a court should give that intention legal authority
as against text, purpose, or anything else.
51. But see Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, in LEAVES OF GRASS AND OTHER WRITINGS 78 (“I am large,
I contain multitudes.”).
52. This is not to say some puzzles remain here. One might ask whether the relevant intent for a
regulation issuing from a cabinet agency is the agency head or the President, or what to do about
regulations that multi-member commissions promulgate.
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Skidmore. And, as quoted above, this is in line with how Henry Hart used
Skidmore in his Seminole Rock briefing. Although such deference would have
less force in the agency’s construction of legislation written by Congress, the
interpretive logic of the time suggests great deference toward the author’s own
reportage.53 Furthermore, this intentionalist Skidmore reading of Seminole Rock
illuminates why, as Bamzai has discovered and explained, Justice Murphy’s first
draft of Seminole Rock found congressional intent irrelevant to the inquiry.54
Under Skidmore, an administrative author’s account need not be decisive:55
an author’s hasty, poorly reasoned, inconsistent, or plainly countertextual claim
about the meaning of its legal pronouncement would raise suspicions about the
sincerity or reliability of the narrator. Those would also be the very kinds of
flaws that would deprive the agency’s interpretation of its power to persuade.56
Nothing in the Seminole Rock 8-1 opinion suggests the Court saw any of these
flaws in the agency’s reportage, particularly given the Court was reviewing a
legal author’s consistent and nearly contemporaneous reading of a newly minted
regulation.
The dispute in Seminole Rock concerned the regulation the administrator of
the Office of Price Administration issued on April 28, 1942.57 Almost immediately thereafter the government sought to enforce its interpretation of the
regulation in court.58 A district court ruled against the government in April 1944
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed that November.59 The government immediately
and successfully sought review before the Supreme Court, which, in June 1945,
reversed the appellate court and issued its now-famous deferential opinion. It is
an exaggeration to say the ink on the regulation had barely dried before the
Supreme Court handed down Seminole Rock, but the underlying interpretation
followed just on the heels of the Administrator’s dictate.
The primary matter was the intent of the agency author, so long as it bore
other indicia of credibility, and here it did. This reading of Seminole Rock as an
easy application of Skidmore deference also helps explain why nobody at the

53. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 20.
54. See Bamzai, supra note 38.
55. The Government’s briefing even seemed to recognize these potential limits. While noting that
“[t]his Court has gone so far as to say that [such] ‘interpretation is binding upon the courts,’” the
Government explained that its textual interpretation was so strong that “it is not necessary to go that far
here.” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 20–21, Bowles v. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. 410 (No. 914).
Neither Pottsville Broadcasting nor the other three cases in the accompanying string cite discussed
standard of review, let alone offered an alternative to Skidmore. Id.
56. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
57. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 413.
58. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 8–9.
59. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 145 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1944); Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 59 F. Supp. 751 (S.D. Fla. 1944).
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time seemed to think the case was a big deal.60 If Seminole Rock conferred
extensive lawmaking authority to agencies in the way we think about it today,
one would expect a fulsome dissent about separation of powers along the lines
of Justice Jackson two years later in Chenery II.61 (Justice Jackson, I might add,
authored Skidmore.62) Here, we only have Justice Roberts issuing a one-line
dissent agreeing with the court of appeals that the agency’s interpretation was
implausible.
Finally, as Knudson and Wildermuth note, “early cases connected Seminole
Rock with the deference framework for an agency’s interpretations under Skidmore.”63 Early appellate applications of Seminole Rock that did not invoke
Skidmore also undertook rigorous review before ruling on the validity of the
agency’s interpretation—review that is far closer to the less-deferential Skidmore standard.64 These lower courts neither explained the linkage of Seminole
Rock and Skidmore, nor did they justify their rigorous review under the banner
of what we now consider the very deferential doctrine of Seminole Rock.65
Knudson and Wildermuth suggest that this tendency may, in part, have been a
product of inattention to proper standards of review66 or discomfort with the
broad doctrine Seminole Rock had apparently announced.67 That is possible. But
these results are also consistent with the simpler conclusion that Seminole Rock
was an unproblematic application of a more general framework of review that
sounded in Skidmore principles.
III. FROM SEMINOLE ROCK TO AUER AND BACK
If you are sympathetic with old-fashioned intentionalism and think of judicial
review in terms of Skidmore, Seminole Rock is a run-of-the-mill 8-1 case.
Things look quite different, however, if you pluck out and abstract Seminole
Rock’s “plainly erroneous” verbiage beyond this context, such as when courts
review interpretations that long antedate the regulation’s promulgation. Furthermore, if you drop the Skidmore contextualism and Chevron-ize the doctrine by
reading it as a strong, general rule of deference grounded in law-making (not
law-reporting) authority, the doctrine looks even more radical. Finally, drop any

60. See Knudson & Wildermuth, supra note 6, at 63 (“In the aftermath of Seminole Rock, there was
no indication from scholars or the Court that a new doctrine of administrative law had just been
announced.”).
61. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
62. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 134 (1944) (Jackson, J.).
63. Knudson & Wildermuth, supra note 6, at 94–95.
64. See id. at 96 (citing Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 217 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1954)); Danz v.
Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 193 F.2d 1010, 1016 (Emer. Ct. App. 1952).
65. See Knudson & Wildermuth, supra note 6, at 96–97 (citing cases).
66. See id. at 95 (explaining that the link was related to the fact that “in the early period, Seminole
Rock was sometimes erroneously applied in statutory cases . . . . This kind of error is less frequent in
modern cases, [which] require[] lawyers and courts to be much more careful in articulating what
deference standard applies . . . .”).
67. Id. at 98.
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faith in intentionalism, and the resulting doctrine begins to look incomprehensible in the eyes of a 1940’s interpreter.
In short, the move from the Seminole Rock case to “Auer deference”—
understanding Auer as a Chevron-like deference rule presupposing delegated
authority to make policy in the gaps—creates an entirely different doctrine than
envisioned in 1945. It is this retheorization, moreover, that raises the worries
many have about Auer today. If an agency is using delegated legal authority
when it interprets unclear regulations, of course some will worry about separation of powers and self-delegation,68 the possibility of unfair surprise,69 or
agency attempts to game judicial review by seeking deference to interpretations
of regulations that are either vacuous70 or simply parrot the underlying statute.71
But if presumptive deference is grounded in authorial competence, that
changes the game. Seminole Rock deference under Skidmore is epistemic and
defeasible, whereas Auer deference turns on administrative lawmaking in the
guise of interpretation. Reconsider each prominent Auer worry under a framework of Skidmore intentionalism.
●

Self-Delegation: Rather than making new law in the gaps it reserved for
itself, an agency is reporting what preexisting law means. Although
being able to offer privileged testimony about legal meaning is a nontrivial power, it depends on other measures of reliability and a court can
override it.
● Unfair Surprise: An agency that unfairly surprises a regulated party by
turning on a dime faces distinct disadvantages. Skidmore deference in
general favors longstanding and consistent interpretations72 and, from an
intentionalist perspective, an about-face raises doubts about the reliability of the agency testimony. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
unfair surprise exception to Auer it announced in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham.73

68. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting self-delegation concern); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 619–21 (2013) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting self-delegation concern).
69. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 157–59 (2012) (withholding Auer
deference on this ground).
70. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 14, at 1461 (raising this concern).
71. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency does not acquire special authority to
interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it
has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”).
72. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
73. 567 U.S. 142, 157–59. That said, abandoning Auer deference does not eliminate all opportunities
for unfair surprise. Agencies administering unclear statutes might just enforce them through adjudication in a format that qualifies for Chevron deference. See Aaron Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105
GEO. L.J. 943 (2017). This is a serious concern, though one who is skeptical of deference for reasons
beyond self-delegation, and Chevron-gaming might be inclined to withhold deference more generally.
See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2016) (“The theoretical
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●

Parroting Regulations: If an agency regulation parrots a statute, it is far
less plausible to say, as in Seminole Rock, that what matters is the
agency’s intention, as opposed to Congress’s. Rather, it is natural to
infer that the agency is simply borrowing congressional meaning, over
which its epistemic authority is far more limited.74 This is consistent
with the anti-parroting exception to Auer the Court deployed in Gonzalez v. Oregon.75
● Vacuous Regulations: As with parroting regulations, a reviewing court
can rightfully be suspicious when an agency claims that a vague text it
promulgated in notice-and-comment rulemaking in fact had a particular,
unexpressed historical meaning.76
The Auer decision, in short, reads Seminole Rock through the eyes of
Chevron and a concomitant belief that resolution of legal uncertainty is irretrievably intertwined with law- and policymaking. This transposition of Seminole
Rock beyond its original interpretive context creates contemporary worries
about Auer deference. Returning to Seminole Rock’s original constraints dissolves those concerns.
A return to this understanding of Seminole Rock might also be more faithful
to the Administrative Procedure Act’s judicial review provisions. If the framework I described were part of the legal backdrop at the time of the APA’s
codification in 1946—a mere year and a week after Seminole Rock—this
understanding should then inform what it means for a reviewing court “to
decide all relevant questions of law . . . and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of agency action.”77
Finally, this reading deflates Auer in a way that renders it more vulnerable to
overruling. This is so even if one accepts the contested78 proposition that
deference doctrines and interpretive frameworks like Auer merit stare decisis.
presuppositions underwriting a regime of non-deferential review are far more classical in cast than the
moderate legal realism underwriting Chevron.”).
74. Perhaps the agency could argue that it intended something quite particular when parroting
legislative language, but that raises the question of why it didn’t say so. Again, and consistent with
Skidmore, the circumstances allow the reviewing court to doubt that agency’s reliability.
75. 546 U.S. at 257
76. Cf. Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167–68 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring an eight-foothigh fence cannot be understood as an “interpretation” of a more general rule requiring that animal
enclosures “shall be structurally sound and shall be maintained in good repair”).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966). For an argument critiquing Chevron in light of the background principles
the APA incorporated, see Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent,
126 YALE L.J. 908, 986 (2016). Bamzai argues that the APA repudiated then-recent, deferential
developments regarding agency statutory interpretation in favor of a more classical, less deferential
approach that deferred only if the interpretation “reflected a customary or contemporaneous practice
under the statute.” Id. This fits Seminole Rock like a glove.
78. For a recent argument that deference doctrines do not merit stare decisis, see RANDY J. KOZEL,
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT 155–57 (2017); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199,
1214 n.1 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (questioning whether the Court should give
“agency deference regimes” stare decisis effect).
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From this perspective, Auer is neither a foundational doctrine nor a carefully
considered sea change in the constitution of the administrative state, but rather
is an unreasoned misreading of an unremarkable case.79 In fact, by withholding
Auer deference in the context of parroting regulations and unfair surprise,80 the
Court, as a practical matter, is already backing into its original approach to
Seminole Rock.81
Now, deference to agency regulation after Seminole Rock did not begin and
end with Auer, and much of it is inconsistent with this essay’s reinterpretation
of the doctrine. Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, for example, pre-dates
Auer and provides the anachronistic Chevron gloss to Seminole Rock that the
broad defenders of deference now invoke.82 (Perhaps advocates of Chevronstrength deference should call the doctrine “Thomas Jefferson deference,” given
the absence of any reasoned justification in Auer.) And the courts of course
continued to invoke strong deference after Auer, though the most recent Supreme Court application of Auer that does not raise skeptical notes or qualifications occurred seven years ago.83 Even if the Skidmore reading of Seminole
Rock is correct, one could argue that subsequent events have rendered it
irrelevant.
I am not so sure. If the doctrine were systematically and consciously retheorized, uncontroversial, and uniformly applied, a little Seminole Rock revisionism might be beside the point. But the Court has in fact stumbled into its
Chevron-ized reading of Seminole Rock and the resulting doctrine has become
controversial and ridden with exceptions. If the origins of the doctrine do not
compel that reading, and in fact account for the consequent concerns and
exceptions, Auer appears to be a doctrinal wrong turn meriting a reversal in
course.84
CONCLUSION
The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre posits in his book After Virtue that moral
argument today is incoherent and interminable because we use terms and

79. Cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996) (“Never before the decision in Union Gas
had we suggested that the bounds of Article III could be expanded by Congress operating pursuant to
any constitutional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . The plurality’s citation of prior
decisions for support was based upon what we believe to be a misreading of precedent . . . .”).
80. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243 (2006).
81. See Knudson & Wildermuth, supra note 6, at 99 (identifying Christopher as supporting their
theory “that discomfort with Seminole Rock doctrine might lead courts to incorporate more Skidmorelike factors”).
82. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
83. See Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 615–16 (2011).
84. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“One can hardly grieve
for the shoddy treatment given today to Humphrey’s Executor, which, after all, accorded the same
indignity (with much less justification) to Chief Justice Taft’s opinion 10 years earlier in Myers v.
United States.”).
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concepts that originated in an understanding of human nature and goods that we
no longer accept or even comprehend.85 A parallel pattern may have unfolded
with our deference doctrine, which was once rooted in an intellectual milieu less
skeptical of intentionalism and less likely to understand legal uncertainty as a
policy space.
Now, as noted, this is a generalization. Not everyone in 1945 was an
intentionalist, and Legal Realists had already been working to weaken faith in
that form of legal craft. Similarly, today sophisticated work seeks to revive
intentionalism in general86 and to think about it more rigorously in the Auer
context.87 Nevertheless, the deference Auer invokes appears to be a fragment
from an earlier legal era detached from the original suppositions which made its
originating decision, Seminole Rock, unremarkable in the first place. Small
wonder, then, that the Court’s abstraction and expansion of the doctrine in a
different jurisprudential climate has proven controversial.
Just as MacIntyre and others have attempted to rehabilitate and reconstruct
virtue ethics in moral philosophy,88 in recent years, administrative law has
witnessed a neoclassical revival of sorts.89 This has been most pronounced in
the (admittedly minority) movement criticizing Chevron deference. The press to
abandon Chevron appears motivated by a return to more a classical legal cast of
mind, one that less readily accepts administrative law’s dogma that resolving
uncertain interpretive questions is a matter of policy choice as opposed to legal
craft.90 Professor Hamburger’s work on judicial duty and administrative law
plays a large agenda-setting role here in the academic discussion.91 Legalist
criticisms are even more common among judges, with Justice Thomas92 and
now-Justice Gorsuch criticizing Chevron in concurring opinions,93 Chief Justice
Roberts willing to narrow it due to rule of law concerns,94 and D.C. Circuit

85. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 8–11 (2d ed. 1984).
86. See, e.g., RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012); Larry Alexander and Sai
Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speaking?” Some Arguments for the Primacy of Intent in Interpretation, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004).
87. See Stephen M. DeGenaro, Note, Why Should We Care About an Agency’s Special Insight, 89
Notre Dame L. Rev. should be in small caps. 909 (2013).
88. See also G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1 (1958); PHILIPPA FOOTE,
VIRTUES AND VICES (1978); ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999).
89. Cf. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Common Law, NEW RAMBLER (Sept. 26,
2016) http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/neoclassical-administrative-common-law [https://
perma.cc/2ZAB-ZPNF].
90. See generally Pojanowski, supra note 73.
91. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
92. Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately to
note that [the agency’s] request for deference raises serious questions about the constitutionality of our
broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes.”).
93. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149, 1153–58 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (making
the case for de novo review of agency statutory interpretation).
94. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (holding that on questions of “deep
‘economic and political significance,’” any delegation of interpretive authority to agencies must be
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Judge Kavanaugh seeing the doctrine as something that needs to be “fixed” in
statutory interpretation.95
The parallels of neoclassicism play out here with respect to Auer deference as
well. Professor Ekins argues in the opening chapter of The Nature of Legislative
Intent that, until the latter half of the 20th Century, the intent of the legislature
was the lodestar of interpretation in Anglo-American jurisprudence.96 Indeed,
many classical legal thinkers would be baffled by the notion that law could be
authoritative without the mind of, well, an author to make reasoned plans and
choices.97
This is not to say precisely how courts should pursue that intent. In fact, there
is a good argument that sophisticated textualism and intentionalism today are
converging at the level of method, if not justification.98 Ekins, for example,
eschews legislative history,99 and it is far from clear that we should return to the
occasional practice in the classical common law period of deferring to Law
Lords who helped draft the statutes at play in litigation. As with the revival of
virtue ethics in moral philosophy, any bid to include a form of intentionalism in
the neoclassical revival of administrative law needs to respond and reformulate the method in light of criticisms that put it out of fashion in the first
place.100 Therefore, a 21st Century, Skidmore-grounded Seminole Rock may
regard the regulatory author’s claims with a different—and perhaps less
deferential—gaze than its predecessor.
Nevertheless, we should not be surprised that a jurist more amenable to
classical legal thought would be more willing to defer to agency interpretations
in circumstances of authorial reliability. Skidmore deference, in turn, is not
worrisome from that perspective if we understand it as a rule (or standard?)-ofthumb that helps a court leverage administrative insight in its search to discover
what the law truly is. This epistemic deference is quite different from Chevron’s
understanding of deference as a delegation of authority.101
explicit); City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“An
agency cannot exercise interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether an agency enjoys that
authority must be decided by a court, without deference to the agency.”).
95. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150–54
(2016) (advocating limits to Chevron deference); see also United States Telecommunications Ass’n v.
FCC, 855 F.3d 371, 417, 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“For an
agency to issue a major rule, Congress must clearly authorize the agency to do so. If a statute only
ambiguously supplies authority for the major rule, the rule is unlawful” and therefore beyond the scope
of Chevron deference).
96. EKINS, supra note 86, at 1–3.
97. Cf. Steven D. Smith, Law without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104 (1989).
98. I thank Randy Barnett for emphasizing this point.
99. See Ekins, supra note 86, at 268–72; cf. Hillel Y. Levin, Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could
Love, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 89 (2015) (reviewing EKINS, supra note 86).
100. Hence Richard Ekins’ use of philosopher Michael Bratman’s work on joint intention and group
agency to respond to Radin’s, Dworkin’s, and Scalia’s criticisms of intentionalism.
101. Because agencies are not the authors of statutes, a more general embrace of Skidmore would
have much less force regarding agency interpretations of legislation, even if one were amenable to
intentionalist interpretation.
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Tellingly, this critique of Auer uses a cognate method to interpret Seminole
Rock. The gist of my argument is that later interpreters of Seminole Rock missed
the music of the decision’s words by focusing briskly and exclusively on a
snippet of bare text that appears clear and categorical in isolation. A more
contextual approach, which focuses on the broader legal fabric and even the
shared understandings of the jointly authored opinion, is critically important in
understanding the law a decision produces. To accept my argument is to be open
to a more tradition-and intention-dependent way of drawing doctrine from legal
texts, especially for judicial opinions, and to have faith that such an approach is
worthwhile and reasonably determinate.102
So domesticated, Seminole Rock is more consonant with traditional understandings of the rule of law and judicial duty than a Chevron-ized Auer. It is not a
foregone conclusion that all neoclassical critics of contemporary administrative
law would embrace this revisited Seminole Rock. Many are textualists who
think legislative intent is a myth or find judicial use of authorial intentions
illegitimate103 (though, as noted above, the lines between sophisticated textualist and intentionalist methods can blur). Others will think that even this moderate dose of epistemic deference introduces undue bias to the proceedings.104 We
might also worry about courts’ abilities to smoke out insincere professions of
intent by agency litigators. All of these concerns might press for de novo review
of agency interpretations of regulations or exclusion of agency intent from the
Skidmore inquiry.105
Nevertheless, for legalists more hospitable to the intentionalist theory that
grounded classical Anglo-American legal thought about interpretation, a chastened reading of Seminole Rock on its face and facts is ordinary and not
particularly objectionable. In any event, they will find this more constrained
reading of Seminole Rock superior to a blunt, unqualified Auer doctrine. As
discussed above, moreover, this revised reading of Seminole Rock also makes
sense of the apparently ad hoc exceptions to the doctrine that have emerged in
recent years. After Auer, administrative legalists should revisit Seminole Rock.

102. This, admittedly, may be against the spirit of the age. See Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization
of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2006) (“[T]he common law consists of what judges
write in their opinions. What they think or what they say during the proceedings before them is almost
entirely irrelevant.”).
103. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617–19 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(rejecting an intentionalist justification of Auer).
104. Unlike, say, consideration of parole evidence in interpretation of a contract, there is only one
side of the story in play in Seminole Rock. Cf. Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1187, 1189 (2016) (“When judges defer to administrative interpretation, they are deferring to the
government . . . . Such deference . . . is systematic judicial bias in favor of the most powerful of parties
and against other parties.”).
105. Though there is good reason to believe there is little difference between Skidmore and de novo
review. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION 83 (2016) (“Even when courts have plenary [reviewing authority] if they are at all sensible they take into account—for whatever they are worth—the expert
views of agencies, legal scholars, or anyone else with an interest in the subject matter. It would be odd,
to say the least, for a court to willfully refuse even to consider well-informed views.”).

